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Abstract 
The paper deals with self-regulated learning from the perspective of critical-realistic philosophy. In this respect, it is 
focused on existing models of self-regulated learning, which it re-conceptualizes through the current categories of 
critical realism. We draw from the latest works by Bhaskar, Harré and Elder-Vass. Although there has recently been 
a relatively broad critique of methodology used to evaluate self-regulation, very little space has been devoted to 
epistemology and ontology. We believe that the criticism of the existing ontology and epistemology of self-
regulated learning and its reconceptualization in the light of critical-realistic philosophy could contribute 
significantly to the development of a heuristics theory of self-regulated learning. 
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1. Introduction 
In today's rapidly evolving society, in a period of considerable progress and at the same time of many global 
challenges, modern society is increasingly aware of the indispensability of education. Education is thus seen as a 
means of promoting mutual understanding of oneself and others. In this context, the emerging debate about the 
requirement of a "learning society” is appropriate. In education it means a greater emphasis on the selection of 
information, active construction of knowledge, creativity, critical thinking, synthesis and generalization. 
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The basic pillars of any educational society are to learn to know, learn to act and learn to live together. From this 
perspective, learning is understood in a broad sense, as an inner journey, learning about oneself and at the same time 
as the process of forming relationships with others. Such an understanding of education forms a common thread of 
all educational areas at any stage of a formal or informal educational setting and ultimately affects the whole of 
society. 
The concept of lifelong learning generates the discussion on the quantity and quality of education. A question that 
should be raised is, “What should students learn in schools? How should the acquisition of knowledge and the 
development of life skills be balanced?” To answer this question we need to broaden our understanding of the value 
of knowledge. Its purpose is not only to remember specific information, ideas and facts but the search for a broader 
context, evaluation, analysis of ideas, and vice versa. In fact, there is a need to learn a new culture of learning, which 
will be characterized by greater individualization in the construction of knowledge and represented by a cooperative, 
independent and responsible learner. 
A desirable outcome has been achieved over the past few decades under the term of self-regulated learning and is 
characterized as “the processes whereby learners personally active and sustain cognitions, affects, and behaviors 
that are systematically oriented toward the attainment of personal goals” (Zimmerman & Schunk, 2011). This 
phenomenon is the focal point of many scientific fields of psychological research, including research on 
metacognition, cognition, decision making, motivation, volition or problem solving. Each research community 
focuses on different aspects and content of the self-regulated learning process. 
Furthermore, the research has informed educators about several models arising from the theoretical definitions of 
self-regulated learning and validated in practice on the basis of empirical research (see Boekaerts, 2002; Borkowski, 
1996; Pintrich, 1999; Winne, 1995; Zimmerman, 2002, 2005). However, there is no basic model of self-regulated 
learning demonstrating adequate validity and reliability. All views agree that achieving higher levels of self-
regulation is a characteristic of successful students. The development of these specific strategies helps students 
assess their own learning, control their own understanding and if necessary correct errors, which in turn provides an 
important stimulus for the development of the internal potential of students. In this respect, we focused on existing 
models of self-regulated learning and re-conceptualize it through the current categories of critical realism. 
2. Models of self-regulated learning 
Based on various theories (the phenomenological perspective, the constructivist concept, the will theory, the 
socio-cognitive theory, etc.) various models of self-regulated learning have been designed offering several 
definitions and concepts. Authors interpret self-regulated learning a particular theory, which assumes the highest 
level of importance in explaining the process of self-regulated learning. For example, the constructivist school 
focuses on activities that evoke mental operations, create and change cognitive structures based on the experience 
with which students come into the classroom. Traditionally, the teacher takes the lead role. Instead of a directive, 
manipulative or authoritarian approach that are based on drill and external control, the constructivist approach 
highlights existing experience, prior knowledge, intrinsic motivation and mental patterns of individual students. 
The general model of self-regulated learning (Pintrich, 2000) concentrates on the regulation of cognition, 
motivation behavior and context. Pintrich (1999) formulated a conceptual framework for studying self-regulated 
learning comprising four phases: planning and goal setting, controlling and reflecting. In this model, self-regulation 
is understood as the student´s ability to be cognitively, motivationally and metacognitively active in the learning 
process towards achieving the set goals. Self-regulation is perceived as “an active, constructive process whereby 
learners set goals for their learning and then attempt to monitor, regulate, and control their cognition, motivation, 
and behavior, guided and constrained by their goals and the contextual features in the environment” (Pintrich, 
2000, p. 453). 
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For example, the author's research (Pintrich, 2000) shows that there is a positive correlation between self-
regulated learning and a student´s level of self-efficacy. Students, who are convinced about their qualities and skills, 
more often use strategies to regulate their own learning than students who are deemed to be incompetent. 
Furthermore, the research shows that there is a reciprocal link between self-regulated learning and student´s task 
value belief. Students who perceived a certain object as interesting, important and useful used more often self-
regulatory strategies. They also found that students who focus on the learning processes, referred to as mastery goal 
oriented learners tend to be self-regulated students as opposed to those who only focus on the result of the activity, 
i.e. performance goal oriented learners. 
One of the leading authors in this area, Monique Boekaerts (2002), deals with the diversity of self-regulation and 
self-control. The author draws on ideas from Kuhl and Fuhrmann (1998), who pointed out that students who use 
self-regulatory strategies (e.g. regulate attention, motivation, will and emotions), purse their own goals by activating 
a self-rewarding system. In contrast, students who use self-control, follow a set of pre-established goals that are 
consistent with their personal beliefs, and therefore use a system of penalties. Other studies also show that the 
process of self-regulated learning is associated with positive emotions. Both processes are controlled by entity, but 
only the process of self-regulated learning is associated with intrinsic motivation. 
According to Boekaerts (2005), initial motivation plays a central role in the process of self-regulated learning. 
The author believes that students invest time and effort to study hard because it's personally important to them. Their 
effort is in accordance with their subjective theories. However, it raises the question whether and how the teacher 
can affect the development of self-regulated learning and if it is inconsistent with student's academic self-concept. 
Self-regulated learning is not viewed as a unitary construct, but refers to a system concept that integrates activity in 
different control systems (Boekaerts & Niemivirta, 2005). A considerable amount of interrelated processes of self-
regulated learning have been differentiated, involving motivation control, metacognitive control, action control, and 
emotion control. This analytical dissolution into different forms of control allowed to focus on particular aspects of 
self-regulation.  
Zimmerman and Schunk (1989) described self-regulated learning as students´ self-generated feelings, thoughts, 
and actions, which are systematically directed to achieve their goals. The theoretical basis of Zimmerman's cyclical 
model of self-regulation is to be found in the social cognitive theory based on the work of Albert Bandura. This 
model looks at self-regulation as the interaction of an individual's personality, his/her behavior (i.e., motivational, 
cognitive and affective components) and the external environment. Unlike behaviorism, which emphasized the 
influence of the environment on human behavior, the social cognitive theory sees the causes of human behavior in 
the so-called reciprocal determinism. This means that the behavior of the biological and internal layout of the 
individual and the external environment are interact. In other words, self-regulation is viewed as an interaction of 
personal, behavioral and environmental triadic processes (Zimmerman, 2005). An important issue is to find out how 
these processes are structurally interrelated and cyclically permanent. 
From this point of view, self-regulated processes fall into three cyclical phases: forethought, performance or 
volitional control, and self-reflection (Zimmerman, 2005). According to the author, in the first phase, which takes 
place prior to the activity, students analyze their learning task. An important role in its implementation is 
represented by the students' motivational beliefs, perception of their own competence, goal orientation and interests. 
The second phase is the actual activity in which students regulate and manage their learning process, i.e. control and 
observe themselves in the activity. Further, they instruct and regulate their imagination and try to regulate their 
attention and study efforts. The third phase of self-reflection takes place after the learning activities are completed 
and concerns the response to the output. Students look at the learning experience, comparing its results with the 
stated objectives and also, for example, trying to explain its success or failure. 
Wine‘s (2010) conclusions on the recent advances on gathering data and measuring constructs that comprise self-
regulated learning are particularly relevant. According to the author, self-regulated learning is inherently contextual 
and can be conceptualized in terms of events (i.e. context evolves as learners regulate learning). The author believes 
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that self-regulation is present in every human activity although it might be still undeveloped. Successful students are 
different from the less successful ones in being able to start the process without external control and can easily 
improve their learning. Under the proposed model, self-regulated learning is inherently considered to be 
metacognitively regulated behavior allowing students faced with new tasks to dynamically control the selection and 
use cognitive tactics and strategies. 
On the basis of these claims Wine and Hadwin (1998) have proposed the complex four-phase model of motivated 
self-regulated learning. In phase 1, learners make a judgment about the task from memories about similar tasks from 
the past, features typical of the current situation, knowledge about the task and personal attributes that applies to it. 
In phase 2, learners establish their goals and plans. In the third phase learners decide what tactics and strategies will 
be used. The fourth and final phase refers to a critical consideration of all the circumstances that occurred during all 
previous phases and can help students in the future when forming a generalization of their own metacognitive 
knowledge. Students pass through the different phases during the learning process, and each phase is defined by a 
different structure according to the conditions, operations, results (products), goals (standards) and evaluations. The 
authors also admit that the presented phase can be structured in a different order allowing learners to choose their 
own phase sequence. 
Borkowski's process-oriented model (1996) is based on the metacognitive and information-processing 
perspective following the work of Flavell, Brown and Sternberg. Along with Winne's theory (1995), self-regulation 
is defined as a metacognitive process driven towards the development of cognitive strategies. Their theory is more 
strategically oriented and its development focuses on effective teaching. In contrast, other theories define self-
regulated learning as a process that is more goal-oriented. Pintrich's (1999) and Zimmerman's (2002) model is based 
on the social cognitive theory. Both distinguish similar stages of the process and focus on the research of student 
motivation in relation to the frequency of use of self-regulatory strategies and school success. Boekaerts's model 
(2002) is also different from all the others, in that it emphasizes the initial phase of self-regulated learning, i.e. 
setting personal goals based on the assessment of the situation in a particular context. 
Nevertheless, all models share common assumptions. Students who regulate their learning are understood to be 
active participants in their own learning process and adjust their actions, feelings and thoughts as needed in a certain 
situation. In other words, all the models assume that learners actively construct their own strategies and goals, from 
both the external as well as their own internal environment. Another hypothesis is that students have the inner 
potential to regulate their learning. All the models assume that learners can at certain moments control, monitor and 
regulate their cognition, metacognition, motivation and behavior and are able to organize their learning 
environment. Models of regulation presuppose the existence of criteria or standards (set goals) against which 
comparisons are made by the learners. On this basis, learners further decide whether to continue as before, or make 
the necessary changes. 
3. A methodological critique of current approaches to self-regulated learning 
There is a long history of evidence of the assessment procedures used by researchers worldwide to measure 
various aspects of self-regulated learning. The variety of research approaches used reflect how the changing 
definition of the self-regulated learning required the application of decontextualized, domain specific or the 
currently preferred context-sensitive measurements. A combination of procedures is also seen as important. In fact, 
linking the adequate assessment tools can provide a broader picture of the variations in the observed phenomenon, 
which one instrument fails to capture. On the other hand, more research is needed to determine the causes of 
measurement errors. However, the current state of art requires this approach with broader empirical research. 
To reveal what self-regulated students feel, think or do while they are actively regulating their own learning is the 
main aim of many researches. The most widely used approach to achieve this goal is the self-report strategy. 
Reported frequency or level of students´ self-regulated learning is most often measured using Likert scales in a 
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quantitative approach. The results depend on a relatively large sample of respondents providing founded 
conclusions.  
What do items in self-reported learning inventories actually measure? Do respondents think what we mean? 
Typically, using items means asking a learner to imagine the self-regulated process and to answer on a scale 
anchored most likely by “not at all true of me” and “very true of me”. Situations are often expressed without 
specifying the context, for example, “I ask the instructor to clarify concepts I don't understand well”. In this case, 
the item doesn’t focus on the particular course, situation, study environment or task but refers to self-regulation as a 
general skill. At other times, context can be specific and described as self-regulated learning activities within a 
specific course, “I try to identify students in my courses whom I can ask for help if necessary”.  
Findings from the research carried out by Hadwin at al. (2001) raise questions about using self-reports that do not 
reflect context effects. Students were asked to self-report the study tactics they applied, the resources they used, and 
the goals they selected for studying in each of three apparently different contexts: reading to learn, studying for an 
examination, and preparing to write a think paper. The principal-components analyses reported that there was 
considerable shuffling of items across components due to variations of context. The authors' findings support the 
premise that students' reports of self-regulated learning are context specific. 
Karabenick at al. (2007) states that even small changes in the construction of an item can change its meaning. 
The authors are primarily concerned with the cognitive aspects of the survey, i.e. to examine whether respondents' 
understanding of self-report items are in accordance with the meaning and deliberate intent of the researchers, and 
discuss the designed cognitive validity of self-report items. On the basis of the authors’ information-processing 
model (2007), the respondent answering the questions also perceives new information, processing it concurrently in 
the context of stored memory with new information used to select a response. It is assumed that there are three 
critical points that may indicate whether the items were answered in a valid manner. The first critical point is the 
respondents' interpretation of the items (how students interpreted the item). The second is retrieving the information 
stored in the memory that is relevant to the item (what students felt and thought when thinking about the item). The 
third critical point is selecting the item option identical with the information acquired from memory (why students 
chose a particular answer). 
How to construct scales that gain valid confidence in the meaning of the information they provide? These and 
other challenges have been identified by many researchers (Boekaerts & Corno, 2005; Nesbit & Winne, 2006). The 
authors argue that self-reports describe probable choices. Capturing traces that show the cognitive activity of 
learners while regulating their learning processes might be beyond the capabilities of general self-reports. 
There is also confirmed evidence that learners incorrectly stated the frequency of occurrence when reporting 
various phenomena. If calibration were viewed as a kind of inter-rater agreement, students would be deemed quite 
unreliable in reporting the frequency in which they use specific tactics (Winne, Jamieson-Noel, & Muis, 2002). This 
issue, supported by other influences, is popular in the current research literature on how students respond to surveys 
and where they estimate the frequency of events. In this case, students need to collect memories and report about 
qualities such as frequency, usefulness, difficulty, or typicality, where their mental judgment and evaluation might 
unconsciously produce misleading results. Winne, Jamieson-Noel and Muis (2002) further note, that the wording of 
a question or its response scale implies counting (“How many times do you…?”) versus reporting rough 
categorizations (“On average,…?”). Researchers should bear in mind, however, that relatively negligible attention 
has been paid to the critique of current approaches of evaluating self-regulated learning. One of the several 
approaches used to assess the validity of self-regulation measured by self-report surveys is to analyze theories and 
items through the lens of a critical perspective. 
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4. From methodological criticism to ontological and epistemological reconceptualisation  
Despite the fact that methodological criticism addresses the many defects of present research on self-regulated 
learning, we cannot just stay with it. Criticism of this type, though, forgets that problems with methodological 
strategies (namely, examine procedures of events as well as the empirical inadequacy of findings (their validity), 
might be caused by the inexact conceptualization of the social reality – its inadequate ontology and epistemology. 
Due to this fact, we claim that other critically - oriented research of self-regulated learning cannot only be based on 
much higher reflexivity or research methods, but also with a much stronger emphasis on its metaphysics, since it 
creates the prior (not realized) essence of its examination. De facto is, as Imre Lakatos (1970, 1978) once described, 
the essence of each scientific research programme, i.e. concealed premises that lead the research and are not to be 
impeached in any way. 
The main argument  in this direction is based on the fact that the above specified discussion on “recentering“ the 
study of self-regulated learning is performed dominantly on the level of the “middle continuum of science“ 
(Alexander, 1987). It means that it is performed mostly on the basis of theoretical models and methodological 
devices and not on the basis of ontological bases and epistemological strategies, because those are always foregoing 
them. As we are admonished by John Searle: “ (…) social ontology is prior to methodology and theory. It is prior in 
the sense that, unless you have a clear conception of the nature of the phenomena you are investigating, you are 
unlikely to develop the right methodology and the right theoretical apparatus for conducting the investigation” 
(Searle, 2009, p. 9). For the optimal formulation of new theories and/or methods we need to focus our attention also 
on the abstract initial continuum of science where ontological as well as epistemic assumptions in the examination 
of reality are situated. 
From this point of view there is nothing else occurring other than our interest to focus on self-regulated learning 
from the perspective of the philosophy of science that allows to formulate questions such as: What type of  self-
regulated learning is it? What are its characteristic features? What is included in the study of this event and what is 
on the other side omitted and why? Through this procedure we want to offer a framework not only for the 
construction of more exact theories and approaches for studying self-regulated learning, but also a more effective 
and more sensible methodology, because we strongly agree with Gaston Bachelard (1968) that “ the instrument 
always creates discovery“. Nevertheless, the construction of any research instrument is not possible without the pre-
understanding of what shall be examined by it.2 
5. Critical realism as the framework for examination of  self-regulated learning 
As the appropriate approach to the specified objective seems to be philosophy of critical realism, that arises 
from the work of British researchers Rom Harré (Harré & Madden, 1975) and Roy Bhaskar (1989, 1998, 2008, 
2009), who under different labels - transcendental realism, critical naturalism, new realism, dialectical realism etc., 
developed the approach that has now become domesticated in psychology (Harré, 1999; Harré & Gillet, 1994), 
sociology (Archer, 1995; Archer, Bhaskar & Collier, 1998), economy (Lawson, 1997), theory of international 
relationships (Patomäki, 2002) or more generally in philosophy and methodology of social sciences (Elder-Vass, 
2010, 2012; Sayer, 2000, 2010). Since critical realism is a very diversified approach today, we have to state that our 
study will be derived  from the work of Roy Bhaskar and his followers, whereas the works from the flow of critical 
realism that is inspired by the thoughts of Rom Harré shall be used only sparsely . 
 
 
2 In order to explain this point, we have to say, that we have to consider each phenomenon as a black box to be revealed. The method to reveal 
each black box (i.e. what components are placed to it, what relationships are outlined between them and what principles of activity between them 
are supposed), is the result of philosophical work and not  empiric research. Only by their determination we can empirically examine if our 
assumptions are adequate to reality or not. 
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The philosophy of critical realism is constructed around three main concepts that shall be here used for the 
reconceptualization of self-regulated learning – i.e. this phenomenon will be analysed through the three ontological 
assumptions. We shall consider the following: 
(1) The multidimensional and multilevel conception of reality that defines reality as a sovereignty stratified in 
different areas with their own principles, but always mutually connected. The use of this approach allows us 
to see self-regulated learning as a phenomenon subdivided into different domains and levels of reality, and 
not as a unitary phenomenon with unified characteristics. We are convinced that due to this fact we shall be 
able to record in a better way its heterogeneity and “plasticity“, as mentioned by Daniel Little (2006, 2009). 
(2) The concept of causal mechanisms that allows us to formulate optimal theoretical conceptions of the middle 
range and together with that outline the general programme of research on self-regulated learning based on 
the determination of crucial mechanisms that are activated in the case of self-regulation. Whereas causal 
mechanisms will be understood: “(...) as the ultimate unobservable physical, social, or psychological 
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific context or conditions, to 
transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities” (George, Benett, 2005).3 
(3) Specific understanding of causal tendencies on  which we can create a base for a different viewpoint on the 
impact of individual components on causal mechanisms within self-regulated learning than the one that is 
offered by positivists - oriented approaches, whether they take on the form of behaviourism, and thus are 
present in classic models of self-regulation (Boekaerts, 2002, Pintrich, 1999), or their framework of ideas 
arises from procedures of the first generation of the “grounded theory“ (Glasser & Strauss, 1967), where we 
can also identify many positivistic tendencies (see Charmaz, 1996, Clarke, 2003). 
6. Domains and levels of social reality  
Critical realists state that reality is stratified. It consists of two main lamellatelly organized components: (1) the 
so-called domains of reality where events and occasions are expressed in totally different ways, and (2) the levels of 
reality, having their own special class of events, resp. mechanisms, that produce such events. In different ontological 
domains, events or occasions have a different status. 
It is typical for ontological domains that they differ from each other in terms of  the different character of being 
of things and occasions. With regard to this issue, Roy Bhaskar (2008, p. 13) recognizes three domains: (a) real, (b) 
actual and (c) empirical. Considering the  domain of the real, we can state that it is the deepest dimension of the 
social world where things exist independently from their being experienced or examined, while ain of the actual 
consists of all things and events that are known but are not experienced directly by specific participants. In other 
words, the domain of the real represents the world of possibilities, while the domain of the actual is the world that 
people know. The domain of the real is therefore crucial for critically-realistic ontology because the “origins“ of all 
things – causal mechanisms, are to be found in this domain, and they cause the establishment/emergence, 
transformation or lasting of certain events. Finally, as the third ontological domain we shall consider empiricism 
which includes only that what happens to participants, what belongs to the sphere of their actual experience, what 
they experience subjectively. 
The concept of domains, that on the one side exceeds the positivistic and on the other side the radically 
constructivist vision of the world, has crucial consequences for understanding self-regulated learning. Firstly, it 
shows that self-regulation cannot be understood only as an event that takes place in the domain of the actual, i.e., 
 
 
3 For summary of other influential conceptions of mechanisms see (Hedström, Swedber, 1998; Hedström, 2005, 2009; Little 2006, 2009, 2010). 
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what can be said by participants by virtue of their previous understanding and knowledge, and it is an assumption 
criticized today by many authors (Winne, Jamieson-Noel, & Muis, 2002; Nesbit & Winne, 2006, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it cannot be even considered a phenomenon that is bound to the domain of the empirical, i.e., to 
collections of presently reflected contents of participants’ cognition and detectable practice. Preference for the 
domain of the empirical leads to the fact that the domain of the real is neglected, where according to Bhaskar causal 
mechanisms are included that do not have to be realized by the participants or researchers, but despite that they 
create the whole situation giving rise to specific results of the learning processes that they support or protect. Each 
analysis of self-regulated learning should therefore reflect all three domains of reality and especially consider how 
the domain of the real is manifested in the other two domains.  
The concept of levels states that reality is lamellatelly organized. We can find higher as well as lower levels in it 
that are mutually conditional. Whereas a different causal mechanism, i.e., the mechanism of change of structures or 
emergence of new entities is typical for each of them that are typical for the respective level (Bhaskar, 2008, pp. 
168–169). Therefore, different levels of reality reveal different mechanisms pointing to the transformation of their 
structures. Due to this fact, the reasons for changes in structures can firstly  be found always at the level the 
structures belong to. Human actions, therefore, cannot be explained by psychological (for instance, features of 
personality) nor biological (for instance, genes) phenomena, but first of all by social mechanisms. Thus, each 
stratum is autonomous of a certain dimension (Collier, 1994, pp. 111–116).4 
Nevertheless, this autonomy is never total. Therefore, we should add that also mechanisms at lower or higher 
levels can partially interfere with causal mechanisms, which in turn might change the results of their activity. 
Considering the coexistence of both features, we find that in social reality there are two ways of mechanism activity. 
The first operates horizontally and leads to the transformation of structures on that level, and the second is shown 
vertically and can partially modify impacts of horizontal mechanisms; though it does A not represent the reason for 
events/occasions. 
Thus, social reality itself has a relational character (Bhaskar, 1998, pp. 32–35; 2009, pp. 85‒90; Sayer, 2010, p. 
4), because individuals are never alone but always act in mutual relationships of dependence where different causal 
powers might be identified among them. In these terms, social structures represent assumptions and results of human 
activity, they are its necessary condition as well as the product of the participants’ activities. In this context, we shall 
also mention (see also Bhaskar, 1989, p. 4) that all social structures depend on previous social relationships and on 
their mutual. Therefore, it is erroneous to claim  that social structures are able to be transformed easily and at will. 
Their change always depends on previous configurations. 
For the study of self-regulated learning, a few substantial consequences arise from the critically-realistic 
ontology. One of the most important is that we have to consistently identify all levels in which self-regulation takes 
place, because only in that way we can determine the particularity of some mechanisms (their belonging to the 
specific layer of reality); resp., we have to determine which level of self-regulated learning is primary for a certain 
phenomenon. If it is a phenomenon which is primarily bound to the human psyche, as argued by behaviouristically - 
orientated authors (Boekaerts, 2002; Pintrich, 1999, 2000), or which is the result of social behaviour (Zimmerman & 
Schunk, 1989; Zimmerman, 2005). What more? Questioning from this perspective leads to other crucial questions: 
Does self-regulated learning really specify one unique complex mechanism or are there a few different mechanisms 
that are situated on different levels of reality? If the second possibility is true, individual mechanisms should have 
different features and a different logic of operation. 
Therefore, we think that any further examination of self-regulation needs to emphasise the necessity of 
 
 
4 We add that strata can be distinguished in two senses. Firstly, we should consider levels of totally different orders: for example anorganic, 
biological, psychic and social. The second case focuses on different levels within the certain more general stratum, for example within social 
world we can consider economical, political or cultural sphere as well as micro, macro or meso level. 
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determination of mechanisms that are being performed on different  levels of reality. In these terms, we should 
consider: (a) the level of culture that has partial autonomy (Alexander, 2003; Kane, 2000), and where we can find 
meaning in the form of symbols, labels and codes, that allow people to understand the world and that are the basic 
contents of learning; (b) the level of social actions and relationships, for which connections among the social 
participants are typical as well as performative acting, the power of individuals and other status features that belong 
to them and affect the learning situation; (c) the level of the psyche, where interpretations/feelings of the 
abovementioned events take place and on the basis of which the participant considers his doctrine, rules it and 
reflects; (d) the level of neuropsychological processes that depends on biological processes in human organisms (for 
instance hormonal regulation) and that affects the receipt of impulses from the outside environment. 
If we consider for instance Zimmerman’s (2005) theory in this perspective, we discover that the author’s 
conception is in fact situated at different levels of reality. While the role of personality in it supposes mechanisms on 
the psychic level, the area of behaviour primarily includes (but not only) mechanisms related to social acting. The 
author’s last area of interest, that according to him reciprocally determines the previous ones, is generally the 
specified environment where mechanisms at the cultural level, social relationships and  material artefacts can be 
included. From the perspective of critical realism we can therefore critically state  that Zimmerman took a long step 
ahead when he started to consider self-regulation as the phenomenon co-created by different levels. Nevertheless, he 
has not been sufficiently consistent in conceptualizating them nor in his  thinking since he mixes many of them and 
does not differentiate among them analytically enough. 
The focus on different levels of social reality has also one more important aspect, apart from  allowing to  
separate analytically mechanisms at the  horizontal and vertical levels: to separate from each other the powers that 
transfer structures at  the same level of reality(for instance psychic processes which change the participant’s 
personality or specific human actions leading to higher effectivity of  learning) from powers that only speed up or 
protect and/or partially modify the emergence of those phenomena/entities. 
Finally we should  mention that if we accept the statement on relationships of social reality, we have to consider 
those participants whose self-regulation is being examined always as  individuals placed in  specific, historically, 
culturally and socially situated relationships, having the unique configuration that creates a figure of mutual activity 
of the specific levels of social reality together with its mechanisms. Due to this fact Rom Harré (1999, Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2003) unambiguously states the  necessity of “positional analysis“, since the social position of the 
individual affects in a crucial way his psychic processes, and interferes in a gross way with his cognitive and 
emotional processes.5 Each situation of the individual’s participation in  self-regulation is therefore always unique, 
bound to the context which current authors including Winnie (2010)  have clearly noticed.. 
7. Causal mechanisms and causal tendencies 
Another base of critical realism can  be considered the concept of causality. The classic model of causality works 
along the simple scheme of cause and effect, determined upon the (time) regularity of the occurrence of changes 
between dependent and independent variables.  In the language of formal logic it is usually known as: „if A., then 
B“ (see especially Hempel, 1965). Nevertheless, such a model of causal relationships fails in a few points (compare 
especially Lawson, 1997, pp. 17-30). Firstly, it does not correspond to the world’s character that it tries to explain. 
Causes of events and objects  always lie in the domain of the real and not in the domain of the empirical and actual 
that are usually examined by researchers. The regularity between two variables, therefore, does not have imply the 
existence of a  causal relationship. There might be other interfering variables  that cause the change without it being 
 
 
5 As inspiring alternative of positional analysis we can consider for studying of  self-regulated learning principles of methodological localism of 
Daniel Littel (2006, 2009, 2010). A much stronger focus on   context in social research is aknowledged  also by Isaac Reed (2010, 2011). 
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noticed. Secondly, the regularity itself of one variable impact on  another  is problematic since it always depends on 
the specific situational conditions and other elements including accidental factors, which have an impact on the 
result of their activity (see also scheme No. 1). Due to this fact, critical realism does not rely on the causal scheme 
„cause-effect “, but on the so-called causal mechanisms that are situated in the domain of reality. 
The activity of these mechanisms, as emphasised by Bhaskar (2008, p. 50), is not typical of any regularity or 
power, but only a specific tendency in the direction that is affected by the activity of other mechanisms. We cannot 
therefore talk about causal connections, but only about specific tendencies or typical figures. This is because if any 
other mechanisms interfere with this tendency, totally different effects might occur. The results of a specific 
combination of variables, therefore, do not imply  the permanent property of variables or conditions that generate 
them. They are only the tendency which is typical for a certain set of them, but it can be changed any time and the 
results themselves are rarely identical. 
According to Bhaskar (2009, pp. 73-74), the method describing how production mechanisms work can be 
illustrated in the chart below that shows how mechanisms influence each other during their activity and how they 
affect due to the combining results of their  mutual activity. The chart also shows  the main difference between the 
classical conception of a multifactor causal effect, which is used, for example, by factor analysis, and figures of 
causal mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Activity of causal mechanisms. 
 
During the first stage of activity of the individual components of the specified mechanisms individual and/or of a 
few mechanisms together (M1 to M3), we can observe how they influence each other, underlying what will be their 
final impact – effect (E). There is a different activity of production mechanisms typical for the second stage which 
causes different effects. These depend especially on the interaction of causal activity results causing the instability 
of the result (E). Due to this fact, we should look at the activity of the product mechanisms as a tendency and not as 
simple causal relationships. Within them we can determine only the tendency of activity, not its exact result. 
8. Discussion 
Successful students are often described as active learners who are responsible for their own learning 
(Zimmerman, 2002). Those students direct their own learning without being directed from the outside. Additionally, 
self-regulated students complete their learning tasks better, they are more motivated and successful in school. 
Despite numbers of theories and models on self-regulated learning having been examined for decades, there is no 
specific model that can be applied when researching the process of regulated learning. In this context, research 
approaches were exposed to criticism for not sufficiently reflecting the real examined phenomena of self-regulated 
learning occurring in a particular context, and in certain situations to specific participants. Accordingly, self-
regulated learning should be treated as a situation specific construct (Greeno, 2006).  
M2 
M1 M3 M2 
M3 M1 
II. stage of production 
mechanisms’ activity 
I. stage of production 
mechanisms’ activity  
E E 
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Recent empirical studies on self-regulated learning should therefore reflect all three domains of reality (i.e. the 
real, actual and empirical domains). An alternative sense of scientific research in studying self-regulated learning 
arises from the concept of causal mechanisms which we believe also reflects  many points of the current 
methodological critique (see Hadwin at al., 2001; Karabenick at al., 2007; Winne, Jamieson-Noel, & Muis, 2002). A 
strong scientific programme (Bloor, 1991) should be based on the search for specific causal mechanisms instead of 
great theories describing results of self-regulated learning with no regard to the variability of its context, contents 
and participants. Therefore, we have to find a methodology which will help to discover the specific causal 
mechanisms operating in the respective environment. In other words, rather than a universal invariant structure, we 
should try to find an explanation of variability in the mechanisms of self-regulated learning, i.e. signs of what cause 
the main differences – especially changes and variations – through time and space in the character of self-regulated 
learning. Such alignment seems to be especially important when we realize that social/psychic entities are not fixed 
objects with stable features, as argued by Abbot (1999), but always changing “plastic entities“(Little, 2006, 2009). 
Transferring the focus on variability and mechanisms, though, allows us to avoid dangerous essentialism and 
reification of the respective phenomenon.  
With regard to such formulated epistemology, we have to add that we should consider mechanisms of the above 
mentioned levels, i.e.: (a) how different cultural contents (symbols, meanings and codes) affect self-regulated 
learning that seems to happen after a „cultural turn“ (Back et al., 2012; Crane, 1994) in the social sciences more 
important objective; (b) how different forms of actions, practices and social relationships affect self-regulated 
learning – how the ability to manage one’s own studying activity emerges within the network of social relationships; 
(c) how different interpretation operations and psychic mechanisms affect self-regulated learning at the level of 
human cognition. Combining together the three levels and their crucial mechanisms will allow disclosing what 
causal tendencies are created by these mechanisms and, therefore, allow the whole variability of results of self-
regulated learning to be established. 
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